Introduction
Our article examines key aspects of the Greek crisis and explores it under the light of the ongoing decline of the European Social Model. It is argued that the austerity measures implemented as conditions for receiving consecutive 'bail-out' loans have had, so far, a very negative impact upon the Greek economy, politics and society. Further, it is argued that labour market reforms underway in Greece and the rest of Southern Europe signal some very worrying developments with respect to the social dimension of European integration. Indeed, especially in the area of collective agreements, when we view these reforms from a European perspective we can identify the rise of wage policy interventionism by the EU; a new process that 'combines European requirements for national wage and labour market policies with the threat of economic sanctions' (Busch et al (2013:8) . In turn this signals the intensification of the (neo) liberalisation of the European Social Model and puts under severe doubt the prospects for a more social Europe that will prioritize social objectives and rights over economic freedoms.
The article is structured as follows. The next section deals briefly with the causes of the politico-economic crisis in Greece. It is followed by a discussion of the economic and political effects of the crisis and the impact of austerity measures and reforms. The article continues with a longer section that discusses the impact upon the Greek society and, especially on the familistic model of social reproduction in Greece. In its last part, the article explores the character of labour market reforms in Greece within the context of the ongoing decline of the European Social Model and reflects upon the future prospects for a more social Europe.
April 2010, Greece became the first Eurozone member state to formally seek financial assistance from the so-called troika, comprising the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the European Central Bank. The austerity measures and neo-liberal economic reforms that accompanied the IMF/EU/ECB so-called 'bail out' loans were unprecedented, in their scope, severity, volume and speed. Severe cuts in pensions and wages, extraordinary increases in taxation and dramatic decreases in public spending in most welfare sectors (social security, education, health) accompanied the most extensive de-regulation of industrial relations in Greek history and the abolition of many hard-won socio-economic rights of numerous professions -both in the public and private sectors (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2012) . These measures were taken in tandem with an overambitious programme of far-reaching reforms in public administration that includes the future dismissal of thousands of state employees, further privatisation of state enterprises and the selling-off of public property.
Explanations of the causes of the Greek crisis oscillate between those that give emphasis to domestic causes and those that emphasize systemic reasons. For the former, the crisis is mainly attributable to the behaviour of a profligate society that 'consumed beyond its means', and its corrupt governments that run large public debts and budget deficits. For the latter approach, the crisis was the outcome of chronic economic inadequacies and lack of policy options within the Euro, mostly outside the country's influence, with domestic factors acting as triggers rather than as causes of the crisis. In an earlier work (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012) we drew from both approaches to argue that the eruption of the crisis was the combined result of 'perfect storm' conditions, both domestic and external and placed it in a historical context of repeated state bankruptcies. We also argued that the continuation and deepening of the crisis is a product of the very measures that were taken, supposedly, to alleviate it.
In terms of the domestic causes, the politico-economic regime established after the collapse of dictatorship in 1974 used state resources and public borrowing (see Figure 1 ) not only as a means to legitimize the young democracy but also to maintain the political reproduction of ruling elites (see Kouvelakis, 2011; Katsimi and Moutos, 2010; Karamesini, 2008) and facilitate their enrichment in the context of the semi-peripheral Greek political economy (see Fotopoulos, 1993) . Thus, the current crisis in Greece is not purely economic in nature but deeply politico-economic. It marks, among other things, the exhaustion of the politicoeconomic regime that emerged in Greece in the last 35 years characterized by state patronage and clientilism, extensive tax evasion practices (especially of higher earners, businesses and powerful individuals) while privileging specific socio-professional groups via a fragmented and highly unequal social security system (Petmesidou, 1991 and Venieris, 1997) . Further, its corresponding semi-peripheral political economy was 'benefiting' from the functioning of a substantial underground economy, that utilized uninsured and precarious labour, keeping production costs low, while continuing with familistic welfare arrangements that 'externalised' the costs of social reproduction to Greek families (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013) . These costs continued to remain low, especially since the mid 1990s, due to the extensive use of migrant workers, most of whom where undocumented, especially in the agriculture, construction and domestic/care sectors.
Regarding the systemic factors, one of the key economic consequences of Greece's entry in the Eurozone in 2001 was the dramatic amplification of the already widening asymmetries in productivity and competitiveness between Greece's semi-peripheral economy and those of core EU countries, asymmetries that followed Greece's entry in the EEC in 1981 (see Fotopoulos, 1993) . Following the adoption of the Euro, economic growth in the Greek economy was maintained primarily by boosting domestic demand through consumption and to a lesser extent investment in construction and real estate. While the supply of cheap credit from the European Central Bank (ECB) allowed the banking sector to expand rapidly, at the same time the real economy did not yield enough streams of revenue to prevent the accumulation of a high domestic debt while trade deficit worsened (see also Lapavitsas et al, 2010) . The combination of these systemic factors contributed towards the 'twin deficits' of Greece, on government budget and on the current account balance, which deteriorated dramatically during the period 1999 -2008 . The end result was that the negative tendencies prior to the entry into Euro (trade deficits, dismantling of the structure of production etc.) were further amplified. The lack of the policy option to issue its own currency meant that, within Euro, Greece's semi-peripheral capitalism stood little chance of balanced endogenous growth (Lapavitsas, 2011; Polychroniou, 2011) similar to other semiperipheral EU economies like Portugal and Ireland (Mansori, 2011) .
The politico-economic impact of the crisis and austerity measures
The combined impact of the crisis and the austerity measures does not allow any room for optimism, economically, socially or politically. Economically, the rapid decline in domestic closure of hundreds of thousands of small-medium (mostly family-owned) businesses. In addition, unemployment has soared and private indebtedness has increased dramatically.
The real economy is in a dire state, with GDP continuing to contract year after year with little or no prospect for growth in the short and medium term future. Socially, there is ample evidence of negative developments in respect to social cohesion, poverty and social exclusion, all of which are combined with a dramatic rise in suicides, social unrest and social violence more generally, as well as continuous rise in xenophobia and racism.
Politically, nearly 3 years after the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, the collapse of the two-party system is evident. This collapse was followed by a substantial increase in 
Impact on Greek economy and employment
The austerity measures adopted under the agreements made with the IMF/EC/ECB included, among other things, relentless taxation and substantial reductions in pensions and wages. In effect, the Greek state has taken billions of Euros out of the (real) Greek economy in order to reduce the budget deficit (and serve the debt) and the results, though predictable, surprised negatively even the most pessimist analysts. By the end of 2011, the Traditionally, in the familistic model of welfare capitalism in Southern Europe, and especially in Greece, the family played a double role as the main institution for social protection and care of its members and, simultaneously, as a key institution in the reproduction of the particular model of semi-peripheral political economy. The role of the family was not confined to household members but involved utilizing an extensive network of kin that 'provides a mechanism for aggregating and redistributing resources among its members' (Allen et al 2004 : 116, see also Ferrera, 1996 . In a recent study (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013a) we argued that this role was interlinked with the capacity of the family to consolidate and mobilise resources as  an owner of property (especially private but also commercial real-estate)
 an employer (usually via family business)
 a member of the clientelistic political system  a claimant of social security rights (through members able to secure such rights through their participation in the formal labour market and especially though public sector employment). This point can be supported by analysing the evolution of private debt. Despite the fact that Greek private debt is significantly lower that other Eurozone countries and the UK, private debt and in particular household borrowing boomed a few years before, and especially after, the coming of Euro. In fact it increased faster than the public debt ( The same study recorded substantial increases in feelings of melancholy, symptoms of clinical depression, suicidal thoughts and self-reported suicidal attempts. More recent comparative studies on the impact of austerity cuts upon health recorded dramatic rises in suicides as well as incidence of mental health disorders across Europe, especially in Greece and Spain (Coghlan, 2013) . According to Violatzis (2011) the total number of suicides doubled in the years of the crisis; an unprecedented development for Greece, a country that traditionally recorded one of the lowest suicide rates in the EU.
Change in gender dynamics and lack of public support for families
Despite the very high female unemployment in Greece many women tried to enter again the labour market after the crisis. Reflecting on this observation Karamessini (2011) mentioned 'It's an attempted defence against the crisis […] As joblessness rises among men, a growing pool of women are seeking to offset losses in household income [but] most aren't finding work'. This tendency was confirmed by Paul Swaim, a principal OECD labor economist. Although female employment rate in Greece dropped since 2008, female labor force participation rate increased by 2.9 percent (almost 3 times E.U. average), which, as Swaim argued 'shows that Greek women ventured into the labor market in a bid to cushion the impact of the recession on their family's income but often failed to find a job, at least one that is reported to the government' (Swaim, 2011) .
Further, those lucky who do find jobs, often find positions inferior to their qualifications while salaries are so low that the prospect for young couples to have more than one child has almost disappeared. At the same time any childbearing plans for childless couples are pushed way back in time (see the extensive report of New York Times, 2011). And more, under conditions of high and rising unemployment, with employment rights severely curtailed and job insecurity rampant, employers can make the most audacious, and often illegal, demands. It has become almost universal practice 'in the private sector [that] if you look for a job and you are of reproductive age the first thing you have to do is give your word of honour that you will not get pregnant' as Pantazi, chair of the Women's Union of Greece, commented in an interview in the Guardian (2012) . Against such developments it is reasonable to assume that the already very low fertility rate in Greece (estimated at 1.39 in 2011) will fall even further.
Moreover, it is expected that severe cuts in the public sector, both in expenditures and in terms of personnel, are already having a negative impact upon employment security and it http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 26/01/2020 06:15:36 | appears that this impact is far more severe upon women than men. Karamessini (2011) mentioned that "the state used to represent a guaranteed source of employment for women and had boosted gender equality" with almost 60% of female university graduates traditionally finding employment in the wider public sector. Further, in a NYT report (2011) it was also mentioned that 'the prospects for female entrepreneurs are also slim as small businesses, which constitute 96 percent of all enterprises in Greece, are closing at a rate of one in four'.
At the same time, a large number of publicly provided services and sectors (e.g. hospitals, schools, universities, welfare services) are facing a double challenge. On the one hand they have to offer their services under serious economic constraints, reduced staff and budgetary cuts -as the state withdraws its funding. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that they are facing substantial rises in the demand for accessing their services given that large parts of the middle classes begin withdrawing from private services as their incomes diminish and, further, that the demand on the voluntary and non-governmental sector to fill the gap will intensify (see Eleftherotypia, 2011 and the Guardian, 2012 ). Indeed marketbased solutions are no longer an option for many families. As Maria Stratigaki, head of the government's General Secretariat for Gender Equality, mentioned 'paying for help with child care' is an expense that fewer and fewer women will be able to afford' (NYT, 2011).
The Greek crisis as part of the crisis of the European Social Model
Against the evidence presented thus far, it is important to see not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspects of the austerity measures and reforms and place them in a wider European context. It is evident that the austerity measures and reforms undertaken so far (for a detailed discussion of reforms see Venieris, forthcoming) 
Conclusion: Anti-social policy in Greece amidst the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism in Europe
If we adopt the classic normative view of social policy -originally developed by authors like Otto von Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst to describe sets of policies that place the cohesion of society at their core (Cahnman and Schmitt 1979: 51) -then the sum of the austerity measures and reforms adopted by successive Greek governments can be indisputably characterised as anti-social policy. With large numbers of households and family business indebted, record high unemployment and poverty rates, and successive closure of hundreds of thousands of small businesses, middle classes in Greece are facing a free fall in their incomes and an unprecedented assault in their socio-economic security. The strategy of internal devaluation promoted by the troika and adopted by the Greek governments, the cuts in salaries, benefits and pension entitlements, and the imposition of a highly regressive tax system, continues to place Greece in a downward spiral of a prolonged recession from which no end is in sight. At the end 2012 the Debt to GDP ratio exceeded 172% of GDP, from 120% in 2009, the year prior to the 'bailout loan' agreement. Moreover, at the end of the year of writing this article (2013), Greek GDP is expected to shrink by a further 4.5%, bringing the total contraction of GDP to 25%, since 2008 (Elstat, 2013) .
Out of the ruins of the traditional familistic mode of social reproduction, undermined by more than a decade of indebtedness and almost 3 years of relentless austerity, a political economy of generalised insecurity emerges. Although nearly all social risks are 'familialized', access to resources for social protection is severely restricted for large number of Greek families. The electoral collapse of the established political parties that supported the austerity measures, the rise of political polarisation, xenophobia and racism, the rise of poverty and social dislocation, the dissolution of social cohesion and the reaffirmation of defensive nationalism against what is perceived as a massive attack on national sovereignty are only a few of the socio-political outcomes of the crisis and the anti-social policies currently implemented. Combined with massive unemployment and underemployment, increases in employment insecurity, the removal of hard-won socioeconomic rights, and continuous attacks on incomes and assets, they create a nightmare scenario for socio-political stability amidst continuing economic decline. Indeed, the Greek social formation faces its biggest challenge since WWII. As long as the measures adopted in Greece, and the rest of the Southern Europe, continue their catastrophic impact upon the economy, politics and society there is little hope that the current trajectory of integration in a market-driven federalist EU will change. Under such conditions, it is perhaps now, more than ever in the post-war European history, that a new path is desperately needed to revive not only the Southern European economies and societies but the European Social Model itself, placing it firmly at the centre of European integration.
